Detalhes do Documento

Controlling excludability in the evolution of cooperation

Data: 2007

Identificador Persistente: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.7/85

Origem: ARCA - Access to Research and Communication Annals

Assunto(s): Evolution of complexity; Excludability; Multi-level selection; Privatization; Rivalry; Tragedy of the commons; Kin selection model; Collective action; Multilevel selection; Social evolution; Commons; Tragedy; Transitions; Competition; Repression

Descrição
Background: A tragedy of the commons arises if individuals cannot protect their future use of a depletable resource, and individual fitness increases if individuals exploit the resource at rates beyond sustainability. Natural selection then forces the individuals to diminish, perhaps even to destroy, their resource. One way to protect future use is privatization - that is, locally excluding rivals from the resource. Another is to reduce rivalry among individuals by restricting exploitation rates.

Tipo de Documento Artigo
Idioma Inglês