Document details

How compensation policy based on EVA performance reduces the conflict between m...

Author(s): Ribeiro, Humberto cv logo 1 ; Fonseca, Cristina cv logo 2

Date: 2005

Persistent ID: http://hdl.handle.net/10198/8310

Origin: Biblioteca Digital do IPB

Subject(s): EVA; Compensation policy


Description
There is a well-known conflict between managers and shareholders, superbly illustrated by the agency theory. A way for shareholders to ensure that managers will perform optimally, by taking the best actions and decisions, is to tie managers’ compensation to the performance of the firms. However, how can we fairly measure their performance? The Economic Value Added (EVA) methodology seems to be a good solution; recent events reinforced the idea that accounting indicators analysis may not be a suitable approach. The EVA is not a widespread concept in Portugal and its inception is relatively recent. To have an idea about how Portuguese managers perceive EVA and to understand which strategies (e.g. wages policy, bonuses, stocks and/or stocks options) firms utilize to make everybody happy, particularly managers, we developed a study with Portuguese public entities, using the questionnaire methodology.
Document Type Conference Object
Language English
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    Financiadores do RCAAP

Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia Universidade do Minho   Governo Português Ministério da Educação e Ciência Programa Operacional da Sociedade do Conhecimento EU