Encontrados 14 documentos, a visualizar página 1 de 2
Horizontal mergers and product quality
Brekke, Kurt R.; Siciliani, Luigi; Straume, Odd RuneUsing a spatial competition framework with three ex ante identical firms, we study the effects of a horizontal merger on quality, price and welfare. The merging firms always reduce quality. They also increase prices if demand responsiveness to quality is sufficiently low. The non-merging firm, on the other hand, always responds by increasing both quality and prices. Overall, a merger leads to higher average pri...
Hospital mergers with regulated prices
Brekke, Kurt R.; Siciliani, Luigi; Straume, Odd RuneWe study the effects of a hospital merger using a spatial competition framework with semialtruistic hospitals that invest in quality and expend cost-containment effort facing regulated prices. We find that the merging hospitals always reduce quality, whereas non-merging hospitals respond by increasing (reducing) quality if qualities are strategic substitutes (complements). A merger leads to higher average treat...
Hospital mergers : a spatial competition approach
Brekke, Kurt R.; Siciliani, Luigi; Straume, Odd RuneUsing a spatial competition framework with three ex ante identical hospitals, we study the effects of a hospital merger on quality, price and welfare. The merging hospitals always reduce quality, but the non-merging hospital responds by reducing quality if prices are fixed and increasing quality if not. The merging hospitals increase prices if demand responsiveness to quality is sufficiently low, whereas the no...
Hospital competition with soft budgets
Brekke, Kurt R.; Siciliani, Luigi; Straume, Odd RuneWe study the incentives for hospitals to provide quality and expend cost-reducing effort when their budgets are soft, i.e., the payer may cover deficits or confiscate surpluses. The basic set up is a Hotelling model with two hospitals that differ in location and face demand uncertainty, where the hospitals run deficits (surpluses) in the high (low) demand state. Softer budgets reduce cost efficiency, while the ...
Can competition reduce quality?
Brekke, Kurt R.; Siciliani, Luigi; Straume, Odd RuneWe study the effect of competition on quality in markets such as health care, long-term care and education, when providers choose both prices and quality in a setting of spatial competition. We offer a novel mechanism whereby competition leads to lower quality. This mechanism relies on two key assumptions, namely that the providers are motivated and riskaverse. Our proposed mechanism can help explain several em...
Quality competition with motivated providers and sluggish demand
Siciliani, Luigi; Straume, Odd Rune; Cellini, RobertoWe study incentives for quality provision in markets where providers are motivated (semi-altruistic); prices are regulated and firms are funded by a combination of block grants and unit prices; competition is based on quality, and demand adjusts sluggishly. Health or education are sectors in which the mentioned features are the rule. We show that the presence of motivated providers makes dynamic competition tou...
Patient mobility, health care quality and welfare
Brekke, Kurt R.; Levaggi, Rosella; Siciliani, Luigi; Straume, Odd RunePatient mobility is a key issue in the EU who recently pased a new law on patients`right to EU-wide provider choice. In this paper we use a hotelling model with txo regions that differ in technology to study the impact of patient mobility leads to too low (higt) quality and two few (many) patients being treated in the high-skill (low-skill) region. A centralised solution with patient mobility implements the fir...
Quality competition with profit constraints : do non-profit firms provide highe...
Brekke, Kurt R.; Siciliani, Luigi; Straume, Odd RuneIn many markets, such as education, health care and public utilities, firms are often profit-constrained either due to regulation or because they have non-profit status. At the same time such firms might have altruistic concerns towards consumers. In this paper we study semi-altruistic firms’ incentives to invest in quality and cost-reducing effort when facing constraints on the distribution of profits. Using a...
Price and quality in spatial competition
Brekke, Kurt R.; Siciliani, Luigi; Straume, Odd RuneWe study the relationship between competition and quality within a spatial competition framework where firms compete in prices and quality. We generalise existing literature on spatial price–quality competition along several dimensions, including utility functions that are non-linear in income and cost functions that are non-separable in output and quality. Our main message is that the scope for a positive rela...
Competition and quality in regulated markets : a differential-game approach
Brekke, Kurt R.; Cellini, Roberto; Siciliani, Luigi; Straume, Odd RuneWe investigate the effect of competition on quality in health care markets with regulated prices taking a differential game approach, in which quality is a stock variable. Using a Hotelling framework, we derive the open-loop solution (health care providers set the optimal investment plan at the initial period) and the feedback closed-loop solution (providers move investments in response to the dynamics of the s...
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