This paper develops a model where the incumbent may expand to a related market to signal economies of scope and deter entry in the former market. We show that the incumbent only expands when scope economies are large enough. Thus expansion is a signal of larger economies of scope and, for certain parameter values, leads to entry deterrence. Although our game is twoperiod, the expansion strategy creates a long-t...
We consider the use of advertising expenses as quality signals in multiproduct firms, extending previous results on single product firms. In our model, a firm introduces sequentially two products whose qualities are positively correlated.We investigate whether there exist information spillovers from the first to the second market. We show that, when correlation is high, the equilibrium in market 2 depends on th...
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