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Practical realisation and elimination of an ECC-related software bug attack
Brumley, B. B.; Barbosa, Manuel Bernardo; Page, D.; Vercauteren, F.We analyse and exploit implementation features in OpenSSL version 0.9.8g which permit an attack against ECDH-based functionality. The attack, although more general, can recover the entire (static) private key from an associated SSL server via $633$ adaptive queries when the NIST curve P-256 is used. One can view it as a software-oriented analogue of the bug attack concept due to Biham et al. and, consequently, ...
Type checking cryptography implementations
Barbosa, Manuel Bernardo; Page, D.; Moss, Andrew; Rodrigues, Nuno F.; Silva, PauloProceedings da conferência Fundamentals of Software Engineering 2011 ; Cryptographic software development is a challenging field: high performance must be achieved, while ensuring correctness and compliance with low-level security policies. CAO is a domain specific language designed to assist development of cryptographic software. An important feature of this language is the design of a novel type system intr...
Compiler assisted elliptic curve cryptography
Barbosa, Manuel Bernardo; Moss, Andrew; Page, D.Although cryptographic software implementation is often performed by expert programmers, the range of performance and secu- rity driven options, as well as more mundane software engineering issues, still make it a challenge. The use of domain specific language and com- piler techniques to assist in description and optimisation of cryptographic software is an interesting research challenge. Our results, whi...
On the automatic construction of indistinguishable operations
Barbosa, Manuel Bernardo; Page, D.An increasingly important design constraint for software running on ubiquitous computing devices is security, particularly against physical methods such as side-channel attack. One well studied methodology for defending against such attacks is the concept of indistinguishable functions which leak no information about program control flow since all execution paths are computationally identical. However, construc...
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