Autor(es):
João Correia-da-Silva 
; Carlos Hervés-Beloso
Data: 2012
Identificador Persistente: http://hdl.handle.net/10216/65314
Origem: Repositório Aberto da Universidade do Porto
Detalhes do Documento
General equilibrium in economies with uncertain delivery
Descrição
We consider a general equilibrium model of trade ex ante with differential information in which agents choose plans of state-contingent lists of bundles. Being unable to verify that the state of nature is s and not t, an agent has to accept the delivery of any bundle in the list for delivery in state s or in the list for delivery in state t. Under the assumption that each state of nature can be verified by at least one agent, we establish existence of equilibrium and we show that the equilibrium allocation satisfies a notion of coalitional incentive compatibility.
We consider a general equilibrium model of trade ex ante with differential information in which agents choose plans of state-contingent lists of bundles. Being unable to verify that the state of nature is s and not t, an agent has to accept the delivery of any bundle in the list for delivery in state s or in the list for delivery in state t. Under the assumption that each state of nature can be verified by at least one agent, we establish existence of equilibrium and we show that the equilibrium allocation satisfies a notion of coalitional incentive compatibility.
Tipo de Documento
Artigo
Idioma Inglês
Idioma Inglês
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